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Abstract
This study proposes a model of non-unitary time discounting and examines its welfare implications.
A key feature of our model lies in the disparity of time discounting between multiple distinct goods,
which induces an individual’s preference reversals even though she normally discounts her future utilities
for each good. After characterizing the time-consistent decision-making by such an individual in a
general setting, we compare welfare achieved in the market economy and welfare in the planner’s
allocation from the perspective of all selves across time. Under certain situations, the selves in early
periods strictly prefer the social planner’s allocation, whereas the selves in future periods strictly prefer
the market equilibrium. Therefore, the welfare implications of our model are quite different from those
in the canonical discounting model and in models of other time-inconsistent preferences.
JEL classification: E21; H21; O41
Keywords: Non-unitary time discounting; Time inconsistency; Time-consistent tax policy.
1 Introduction
Father: “Could you mow the yard tomorrow instead of playing football? After completing the
job, I will give you $20.”
Son: “Really? I will. Then, I can buy a new computer game!”
Tomorrow has come.
Father: “Why are you going out to play football? Mow the yard! You promised yesterday,
didn’t you?”
Son: “Sorry Dad. I no longer think $20 is enough for the job.”
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Why did the boy break his promise? Is it because he is a liar? Of course, there are a number of
possible answers to this question. One possibility, suggested by a large body of experimental evidence, is
that preference reversals frequently occur over time in people’s decision-making. As such, it could be that
the boy first regarded $20 (or purchasing a new game) as preferable, but by the following day, preferred
his leisure activity.
Although only one among many hypothetical answers, this possibility becomes convincing once we
consider the domain effect, or domain independence, often referred to in the experimental psychology
literature.1 The domain effect emerges when the discount rates (or factors) differ depending on their
domains. In the abovementioned example, the domain effect emerges if the boy discounts the utility
from the monetary reward ($20) and that from enjoying the leisure activity (football) differently. For
expositional convenience, let R denote the utility from the monetary reward and F denote the utility
from the leisure activity. We assume R < F ; that is, the boy will never mow the yard if asked to do so
right now. Next, suppose that, on the first day, he evaluates the utility from receiving $20 as β1R, and
that from playing football as β2F , where β1 ∈ (0, 1) and β2 ∈ (0, 1) are the discount factors specific to
the monetary reward and leisure, respectively. Then, if the boy discounts enjoying leisure steeply enough
such that β1R > β2F , he will accept his father’s job offer on the first day.
Hereafter, we refer to such domain-specific discounting as non-unitary discounting. If an individual
discounts her future utilities in a non-unitary way, this can make her decisions time inconsistent. There
has been a recent upsurge of interest in models of time-inconsistent preferences, as pioneered by Strotz
(1955) and Pollak (1968). In this context, the individual’s decision-making process is formulated as
a dynamic non-cooperative game played by her different selves across time, where the current self is
aware that her preferences might change in future, and takes this into account when making the current
decision.2 However, much of the literature focuses on a class of quasi-hyperbolic discounting proposed by
Phelps and Pollak (1968), and popularized by Laibson (1997). Therefore, the purpose of this study is to
develop a simple dynamic theory of non-unitary discounting.
In this study, we develop a simple model of non-unitary time discounting and pursue its welfare
implications. As in Hori and Futagami (2019), an individual discounts her one-period utility functions
of consumption and leisure differently. As the boy does in the earlier example, the individual changes
her mind about the relative importance of consumption and leisure as time progresses. Within this
framework, we compare welfare achieved in the market economy from welfare in the planner’s allocation
from the perspective of all selves across time. The results are no longer straightforward, because as a
result of a lack of commitment, each self of the social planner is also involved in strategic interactions
with her other selves. In fact, in their model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, Krusell et al. (2002) show
that the allocation in the market economy surprisingly attains strictly higher welfare than that in the
planning allocation. Hiraguchi (2014) extends Krusell et al. (2002) to a general model of non-constant
discounting, including the original as a special case, and shows that their result is robust. At the same
1For example, based on her experimental studies, Chapman (1996) notes that discount rates may be specific to money
and health status. For an excellent discussion on the inconsistency of intertemporal choices due to time discounting, see
Frederick et al. (2002).
2 For example, see Peleg and Yaari (1973) and Goldman (1980) for the game-theoretic foundations of the solution concepts
in Strotz (1955) and Pollak (1968).
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time, a welfare comparison between the competitive and planning economies gives rise to the following
problem. In order to correctly identify which achieves higher welfare in each period, we must control the
difference in the dynamics of the state variables between the two economies. In other words, we cannot
evaluate which of the economies performs better if we focus only on their overall paths.3
Then, we conduct a welfare comparison in two distinct ways. First, we consider the hypothetical
situation in which, in an arbitrarily given period, a self faces the same value of a state variable in both
economies. It is shown that welfare in the social planning case is always strictly higher than that in the
market economy. This means that welfare improvement is always possible from the realized allocation
in the market economy, which contrasts sharply with the findings of Krusell et al. (2002). Second, we
undertake a welfare comparison between the overall paths of the two economies. We show that whether
the planning allocation is more Pareto efficient than the allocation in the market economy depends on
the relative degree of impatience. The following two cases arise. If the individual discounts future leisure
more steeply than she does future consumption, the planning allocation is preferable to the laissez-faire
allocation for all her selves. However, if the reverse is the case, they are not Pareto ranked. In this
case, we show that there is a unique threshold period before which any selves strictly prefer the planning
allocation. However, after this period, they strictly prefer the laissez-faire allocation. This means that
the allocation in the market equilibrium may achieve a more desirable outcome than the social planner
does for the selves in later periods.
As already stated, the most closely related literature to our study is the set of studies on time-
inconsistent preferences resulting from non-geometric discounting. However, our model is also related to
a class of preferences exhibiting temptations. Among others, Banerjee and Mullainthan (2010) consider
a two-period, many-good economy, and classify the goods into two types. The first is a standard good,
the consumption of which in both periods yields the individual’s lifetime utility in period 1. The second
is a “temptation good,” the consumption of which in period 2 is not valued in period 1, but yields utility
once period 2 has arrived. In their two-period model, temptation goods are interpreted as those with a
discount factor of 0. If we set β2 = 0 in the example at the beginning of the introduction, playing football
is a temptation good for the boy. Thus, our model of non-unitary discounting is closely related to their
notion of temptation.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the illustrative example of non-
unitary discounting, and explains why the time-inconsistency problem arises. It also provides the Euler
equation in this model. Section 3 then extends the framework to a dynamic general equilibrium model
and characterizes the market equilibrium. Section 4 compares welfare in the market economy to that in
the social planner’s allocation. It also shows the existence of the time-consistent policies by the benevolent
government. Section 5 concludes.
3In Subsection 4.4 (p. 56) of their paper, Krusell et al. (2002) make the same argument.
4 In other words, in the model of Banerjee and Mullainthan (2010), time inconsistency occurs. By contrast, as is well
known, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) propose a utility function (and give its axiomatic foundations) that exhibits temptation,
but that is free from time inconsistency.
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2 Preliminary
2.1 Time-inconsistency Problem due to Non-unitary Discounting
We start with a consumer’s optimization in a two-good model, provided that all prices are exogenously
constant. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . There are two distinct goods, c and x. Preferences
of an infinitely lived consumer in period t are given as the following utility function:
Ut = u(ct) + βcu(ct+1) + β
2
cu(ct+2) + β
3
cu(ct+3) + · · ·
+ v(xt) + βxv(xt+1) + β
2
xv(xt+2) + β
3
xv(xt+3) + · · ·
=
∞∑
t′=t
(
βt
′−t
c u(ct′) + β
t′−t
x v(xt′)
)
, (1)
where u(c) and v(x) denote the one-period utility functions from consuming c and x, respectively. Both
u and v are twice differentiable and satisfy u′(c) > 0, v′(x) > 0, u′′(c) < 0, and v′′(x) < 0. Parameters
βc ∈ (0, 1) and βx ∈ (0, 1) are the subjective discount factors for goods c and x, respectively. If βc = βx
always holds, then the utility function (1) is a canonical one. In this study, we allow the case of βc ̸= βx,
that is, the consumer discounts utility from different sources at different rates.
As shown by Ubfal (2016) and Hori and Futagami (2019), the time-inconsistency problem arises
when βc ̸= βx. This is because such good-specific discounting induces an intertemporal variation in an
intratemporal marginal rate of substitution (MRS). Assume two dates, t and T (> t). From (1), we obtain
the following relationship for all cT > 0 and xT > 0:(
βx
βc
)T−t v′(xT )
u′(cT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡−dcT /dxT |dUt=0
⋛
v′(xT )
u′(cT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡−dcT /dxT |dUT=0
,
if and only if βx ⋛ βc. The left-hand side is the MRS between cT and xT evaluated in period t, whereas
the right-hand side is the same MRS evaluated in period T . Thus, as the evaluation date is updated, the
consumer changes her mind about the relative importance between the two goods when βc ̸= βx. For
example, suppose βc > βx: consumption of good x is less postponable than good c from the perspective
of the current consumer. This means that the current consumer does not consider future consumption of
good x to be especially important. However, the above relationship shows that as the evaluation date t
approaches the execution date T , consumption of good x becomes more attractive than under her original
plan.
Note that the driving force of time inconsistency is significantly distinguished from the Phelps–Pollak–
Laibson preferences of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In their preferences, the driving force is a time
variation of the intertemporal MRS between consumption of a single good in two adjacent periods.
2.2 Intrapersonal Game and the Euler Equation
Then, how does such a preference reversal influence a consumer’s intertemporal behavior? We follow
Phelps–Pollak–Laibson to formulate the consumer’s problem as a dynamic intrapersonal game, where the
consumer is composed of a sequence of their distinct “selves” indexed by period t. In their continuous-
time model of non-unitary discounting, Hori and Futagami (2019) derive the (generalized) Euler equation
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under the situation in which a consumer in a period cannot commit to her future selves’ actions. To
obtain clear-cut results, however, Hori and Futagami (2019) follow the calculation procedure developed
by Barro (1999) and thus, specify the functional form of instantaneous utilities from the beginning. By
contrast, our discrete-time framework enables us to derive the Euler equation with general functional
forms of u and v.
The consumer’s flow budget constraint is given by
at+1 = Rat − ct − pxt, (2)
where at denotes the asset holding in period t, R > 1 is the gross interest rate, and p > 0 is the price
of good x. To focus on a single individual’s saving behavior, we assume that prices are exogenous and
ignore wage income here, both of which are relaxed when we introduce non-unitary discounting into a
dynamic general equilibrium model in Section 3.
Throughout the study, we assume that each self is sophisticated so that she takes her next self’s
decision-making into account. Specifically, the self in period t rationally expects her next self’s decisions
to be given by ct+1 = φc(at+1) and xt+1 = φx(at+1), where functions φc and φx are unknown still to
be solved. Once they are given, at+2 is accordingly given by at+2 = g(at+1), where g(a) is given by
g(a) ≡ Ra− φc(a)− pφx(a) from the budget constraint (2). Thus, the self in period t decides the level of
assets in the next period at+1 with the knowledge that it affects the subsequent self’s actions.
5
The optimization problem of the self in a period with her assets given by a is formulated as
V (a) = max
c,x,a′
{
u(c) + v(x) + βcVc(a
′) + βxVx(a
′)
∣∣ a′ = Ra− c− px} ,
where V is the value function associated with this problem. In addition, functions Vc and Vx are defined
as the solutions to the following functional equations:
Vc(a
′) = u(φc(a
′)) + βcVc(g(a
′)), Vx(a
′) = v(φx(a
′)) + βxVx(g(a
′)).
Concerning the intratemporal decision, we obtain v′(xt)/u
′(ct) = p, which means simply that the MRS
between ct and xt equals the relative price p. Concerning the dynamic decision, we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. The Euler equation in this model is given by
u′(ct) = βcu
′(ct+1)R+ (βx − βc)
dVx(at+1)
dat+1
,
or equivalently
v′(xt) = βxv
′(xt+1)R+ (βc − βx)p
dVc(at+1)
dat+1
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If βx = βc, the second term on the right-hand side does not appear, leading to the canonical Euler
equation. By contrast, if βx ̸= βc, the second term additionally provides the marginal cost (or reward) of
5 Throughout the study, we focus on the case in which each self employs Markov strategies whereby she makes a decision
based only on the state variables, in this case, her assets.
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savings. The intuition behind the emergence of this additional term is explained as follows. Suppose that
the self in period t marginally increases her savings at the cost of marginal disutility u′(ct). In response,
the self in period t + 1 changes consumption for both goods by dφc(at+1)/dat+1 and dφx(at+1)/dat+1
units. The resulting marginal utility for this self is given by
d
dat+1
[Vc(at+1) + Vx(at+1)] = u
′(ct+1)R.
The proof is given in the Appendix. However, the self in period t evaluates dVx(at+1)/dat+1 by its βx
times, not by βc. Then, the marginal utility for the self in period t is βc
dVc(at+1)
dat+1
+ βx
dVx(at+1)
dat+1
, which is
less (more) than βcu
′(ct+1)R when βx < (>) βc. In other words, the next self’s consumption additionally
provides the current self with the marginal cost (reward) of savings.
3 Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
As shown in the previous section, a key feature of our model lies in the disparity of time discounting
between multiple distinct goods. To obtain macroeconomic implications of this aspect and pursue its
welfare implications, we now extend the model to a dynamic general equilibrium model. Following Hori
and Futagami (2019), we assume that households differently discount their utility from consumption of a
good and their utility from consumption of leisure.
3.1 Production
A final good is used for consumption and investment. The production function takes a Cobb–Douglas
form, Yt = AK
α
t L
1−α
t , where Y , K, and L denote the amount of output, demand for capital, and demand
for labor, respectively. The parameter A > 0 is the level of total factor productivity and α ∈ (0, 1) is a
constant that specifies the share of capital income in total output. Let Xt ≡ Kt/Lt denote the ratio of
aggregate demand for capital to that for labor. Then, perfect competition results in
rt = r(Xt) ≡ AαX
α−1
t , wt = w(Xt) ≡ A(1− α)X
α
t . (3)
3.2 Households
There is a continuum of homogeneous households with unit mass. Each household (denoted as “she” in
this paper) is endowed with one unit of time, and now derives her utility from consumption of the good
and leisure time. Letting lt denote her labor supply, her consumption of leisure is 1 − lt. The utility
function is now given by Ut =
∑∞
t′=t[(β
t′−t
c u(ct′) + β
t′−t
l v(1 − lt′)], where βc ∈ (0, 1) and βl ∈ (0, 1) are
the discount factors applied to her consumption of the good and leisure time, respectively.
Letting kt denote the amount of capital held by the individual in period t, the flow budget constraint
is given by
kt+1 = Rtkt + wtlt − ct,
where Rt ≡ rt+1− δ and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the depreciation rate of capital. The aggregate variable Xt is taken
as given by each individual.
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Here, let us redefine at as
at ≡ kt +
∞∑
t′=t
wt′∏t′
ν=tRν
,
meaning that at is now total wealth, which is given by the sum of capital and human wealth. Under the
additional condition that limT→∞(
∏T
t=0Rt)
−1aT+1 = 0, which is the transversality condition and indeed
holds in equilibrium, the above budget constraint is rewritten as6
at+1 = Rtat − ct − wt(1− lt). (4)
Once we replace p with wt and xt with 1− lt, we find that each self faces the same problem as identified
in the previous section, except that the prices Rt and wt are now time-varying. Therefore, we have to
formulate each self’s expectation about how these values evolve over time. The self in period t rationally
expects the law of motion of Xt as
Xt+1 = G(Xt), (5)
where function G is a function to be solved. Since Rt = R(Xt) ≡ r(Xt)+ 1− δ and wt = w(Xt), equation
(5) captures the individual’s expectation for the prices in the next period.
Therefore, the optimization problem is recursively formulated as
V (a,X) = max
c,l,a′
{u(c) + v(1− l) + βcVc(a
′, G(X)) + βlVl(a
′, G(X))}, (6)
subject to equation (4). In this problem, functions Vc(a,X) and Vl(a,X) on the right-hand side are
defined in the same manner as the previous section:
Vc(a,X) = u(φc(a,X)) + βcVc(g(a,X), G(X)),
Vl(a,X) = v(1− φl(a,X)) + βlVl(g(a,X), G(X)),
where φc(a,X) and φl(a,X) are the policy functions for c and l. Function g is defined as g(a,X) ≡
R(X)a− φc(a,X)− w(X)(1− φl(a,X)) which gives the level of assets in the next period. Following the
same calculation procedure as Proposition 1, we obtain the following equations:
v′(1− lt)
u′(ct)
= w(Xt), (7)
u′(ct) = βcu
′(ct+1)R(G(Xt)) + (βl − βc)
dVl(at+1, G(Xt))
dat+1
. (8)
3.3 Equilibrium
The Euler equation (8) is very informative when we grasp how and why the time-inconsistency problem
arises in this class of preferences. At the same time, however, note that the unknown function Vl exists
in this equation, meaning that we cannot analytically characterize the equilibrium unless we specify the
one-period utility functions to obtain the functional form of Vl. Therefore, we specify u and v as
u(c) = ln c, v(1− l) = ζ ln(1− l), ζ > 0,
respectively. Under this specification, we first show the following lemma:
6Using the definition of at and limT→∞(
∏
T
t=0
Rt)
−1aT+1 = 0, the intertemporal budget constraint is given by at =
∑∞
t′=t
(
∏
t
′
ν=t
Rν)
−1(ct′ + wt′(1− lt′)) for all t = 0, 1, 2 . . . Then, we obtain Rtat = at+1 + ct + wt(1− lt).
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Lemma 1. Given at and Xt, at+1 is given by at+1 = g(at, Xt) = γR(Xt)at, where γ is defined as
γ ≡
βc + λ
1 + λ
∈ (0, 1),
and λ is
λ ≡
ζ
1 + ζ
βl − βc
1− βl
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Therefore, λ gives the criterion for whether the preferences exhibit non-unitary discounting, since it
deviates from zero if and only if βc ̸= βl. To analytically obtain the equilibrium, we must also assume
full depreciation of capital:
Assumption 1. δ = 1.
This assumption is restrictive, but is made in common with many existing studies that examine time-
inconsistent preferences for the purpose of analytical characterization of the equilibrium (Krusell et al.,
2002; Hiraguchi, 2014, 2016). We show that even under such a restrictive situation, welfare implications
of our model dramatically change when λ takes a non-zero value.
The market-clearing conditions are given by Kt = kt and Lt = lt, which jointly mean Xt = kt/lt. We
then derive the competitive equilibrium by use of a simple “guess and verify” method. We first guess that
the equilibrium labor supply is constant over time, lt = l
eqm. We then guess that the functional form of
G is
G(X) = seqmAXα.
In other words, we guess that the saving rate is constant over time. In addition, we guess that the saving
rate seqm satisfies
seqm < α,
which is verified in the equilibrium.
We now derive seqm and leqm, and verify that these are indeed constant over time. Based on Assump-
tion 1, we can rewrite human wealth as the following simple expression:
∞∑
t′=t
wt′∏t′
ν=t rν
=
1− α
(α− seqm)leqm
kt, (9)
where the detailed derivation process is given in the Appendix. Then, equation (9) gives total wealth at
as
at = a(kt) ≡
[
1 +
1− α
(α− seqm)leqm
]
kt.
Substituting this result, equation (3), and Xt = kt/l
eqm into equation at+1 = γR(Xt)at shown in Lemma
1 yields the following dynamic equation of kt:
kt+1 = γαAk
α
t (l
eqm)1−α, (10)
meaning that
seqm = γα ∈ (0, α).
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The equilibrium consumption is accordingly given by (1 − seqm)A(kt)
α(leqm)1−α. Finally, substituting
this result into equation (7), we obtain leqm as
leqm =
1− α
1− α+ ζ(1− γα)
∈ (0, 1), (11)
which is indeed constant over time.
Given the initial condition k0 > 0, the equilibrium sequence of capital is determined from (10). Let
{keqmt } denote the sequence. Once it is determined, the sequence of all other variables is determined
accordingly.
Proposition 2. There is a unique competitive equilibrium path in this model.
By incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting into a simple neoclassical growth model and assuming
a logarithmic utility function, Krusell et al. (2002) show that observational equivalence holds between
their model and the standard geometric discounting model.7 Barro (1999) shows the same property in
his continuous-time model of non-constant rate of time preferences. Such observational equivalence also
holds between our non-unitary discounting model and the standard discounting model. Consider an
economy in the same environment as ours, except that the representative individual’s preference is given
by
∑∞
t′=t γ
t[ln ct + ζ ln(1 − lt)]. The equilibrium conditions in such a model are given by (10) and (11).
At first glance, this result appears to show that the standard model or the model of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting can replicate all our findings. This conjecture is not correct because, as we show in the next
section, our model yields welfare implications that differ markedly from these preferences.
4 Welfare Implications
In this section, we show that the competitive equilibrium characterized in the previous section generates
inefficiencies. For this purpose, we first derive the allocation by the social planner who can directly affect
the resource constraint by her decisions. The social planner’s preferences are the same as those of the
individual in Section 3, and she cannot commit to her future selves’ decisions. Thus, as in the case of the
market economy, distinct selves of the planner play an intrapersonal game.
The optimization problem of the planner in a period is given by
V sp(k) = max
k′,l
{
ln(Akαl1−α − k′) + ζ ln(1− l) + βcV
sp
c (k
′) + βlV
sp
l (k
′)
}
,
where V sp(k) is the value function of the household when the social planner directly designs the alloca-
tion without a market mechanism. Functions V spc (k) and V
sp
l (k) are given by the following functional
equations:
V spc (k) = ln
[
Akα(φspl (k))
1−α − gsp(k)
]
+ βcV
sp
c (g
sp(k)),
V spl (k) = ζ ln(1− φ
sp
l (k)) + βlV
sp
l (g
sp(k)).
7See Proposition 2 of their paper.
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Lemma 2. In the social planner’s allocation, lt = l
sp and kt+1 = s
spAkαt (l
sp)1−α, where
ssp = βcα,
lsp =
1− α
1− α+ ζ(1− βcα)
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Hereafter, let {kspt } denote the sequence of capital realized in the social planner’s allocation.
4.1 Market Equilibrium versus Social Planning
We introduce the following function:
V eqm(k) ≡ V (a(k), k/leqm),
where function V (·, ·) on the right-hand side is the value function of the household in the market economy,
defined in equation (6). In this study, we compare welfare achieved in the market economy with that in
the planner’s allocation from the perspective of all selves. In other words, we compare V eqm(keqmt ) and
V sp(kspt ) for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
If βc = βl, the value of parameter γ becomes equal to βc and then s
eqm = ssp and leqm = lsp. This
yields the standard result that the competitive equilibrium achieves the socially optimal allocation. By
contrast, if βc ̸= βl, this theorem no longer holds.
Lemma 3. Suppose that βc > (<) βl. Then, s
eqm < (>) ssp and leqm < (>) lsp.
Proof. As shown in Lemma 2, both ssp and lsp are independent of βl. Meanwhile, the equilibrium saving
rate seqm is given by γα, which is strictly increasing with respect to βl from the definition of γ. The
equilibrium labor supply leqm is given by equation (11), which is also strictly increasing with respect to
βl.
Lemma 3 states that if consumption of a good is more (less) postponable than leisure is, then the
saving rate in the market equilibrium is lower (higher) than under the social planner’s allocation. It also
states that the equilibrium labor supply becomes low (high).
Welfare Comparison in the Initial Period: The difference in the household’s saving- and working
behaviors between the two economies induces the difference in the value function between them: V j ,
j ∈ {eqm, sp}. We first focus on this difference and obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that βc ̸= βl. Then, V
eqm(k) < V sp(k) always holds for all k > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition states that given her capital holding k, a self in any period strictly prefers the social
planning allocation than the market equilibrium allocation. Indeed, since the initial stock of capital
is the same in both economies, Proposition 3 states that from the perspective of the initial self, social
planning always achieves higher welfare than the market economy does. This result contrasts sharply with
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the findings of Krusell et al. (2002), whose quasi-hyperbolic discounting model shows that the market
equilibrium always performs better than the planning economy.
Welfare Comparison in the Subsequent Periods: Then, does this result apply to the other selves?
The difference in the household’s behavior also induces the difference in the level of capital in the subse-
quent periods. In this model, we can explicitly solve the sequence of capital in both economies:
kjt = K(s
j , lj , t)
≡ exp
{
αt ln k0 +
1− αt
1− α
ln
[
sjA(lj)1−α
]}
, j ∈ {eqm, sp}. (12)
As is apparent from (12), K(s, l, t) is strictly increasing with respect to both s and l. Then, Lemma 3
yields the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose that βc > (<) βl. Then, given k
eqm
0 = k
sp
0 = k0 > 0, k
eqm
t < (>) k
sp
t for all
t = 1, 2, . . .
In addition, we can show that
Lemma 5. V j(k) is a strictly increasing function for all j ∈ {eqm, sp}.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Then, we arrive at the following proposition, showing that in the case of βc > βl, the allocation in
the market economy is Pareto dominated by that of the social planning from the perspective of all selves
across time.
Proposition 4. Suppose that βc > βl. Then, given k
eqm
0 = k
sp
0 = k0 > 0, V
eqm(keqmt ) < V
sp(kspt ) for all
t = 0, 1, 2 . . .
Proof. Lemmas 4, 5, and Proposition 3 in the main body jointly show this proposition.
Next, consider the case of βl > βc. In this case, comparison of V
eqm(keqmt ) and V
sp(kspt ) is not
straightforward. In the Appendix, we provide the proof for the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose that βl > βc. Then, there exists a unique βl ∈ (βc, 1). When βc < βl < βl,
there exists a unique T ∗ > 0, such that V eqm(keqmt ) > V
sp(kspt ) if and only if t ≥ T
∗.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 states that the equilibrium allocation can achieve a more desirable outcome than the
social planner’s allocation for the selves in later periods. The intuition behind this result is explained as
follows. As stated in Lemma 3, the household cannot help saving excessively in the market economy when
βl > βc. Indeed, as shown in Proposition 3, this induces a welfare loss for the individual. However, such
a decision by the household is favorable for her future selves, because the assets of these selves increase
rapidly.
Based on the above results, can we then accept that surprising conclusion that, in the long run,
a laissez-faire environment performs a better job than the social planner does? We must be cautious
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when answering this question, To clarify this point, we focus on the case of βc < βl < βl. Then, from
Propositions 3 and 5, there exists a period t ≥ T ∗, such that the following two inequalities are satisfied
simultaneously:
V sp(kspt ) < V
eqm(keqmt ) < V
sp(keqmt ).
The first inequality shows that the market equilibrium is more desirable than social planning for the self
in this period, because she can obtain more assets in the market economy. However, the second inequality
also shows that, given keqmt , the self strictly prefers the allocation by the social planner. Thus, the market
equilibrium is suboptimal and welfare improvement is always possible from its realized allocation.
4.2 Implications of Tax Policies
Finally, we now introduce government activity to the market economy. We assume that the government
imposes taxes on individuals’ wage income, capital income, and savings. Letting τr,t ∈ (0, 1), τw,t ∈ (0, 1),
and τi,t ≥ 0 denote the rates of these taxes, the household’s budget constraint now becomes
(1 + τi,t)kt+1 = (1− τr,t)rtkt + (1− τw,t)wtlt − c. (13)
We assume that there is no government expenditure and the government’s budget must be balanced in
each period. The government’s budget constraint is given by
τr,trtKt + τw,twtLt + τi,tKt+1 = 0. (14)
From (14), one of the tax rates is determined by the other two rates. We choose τw,t and τi,t as independent
variables, which are denoted by τt = (τw,t, τi,t).
Our goal is to design a tax policy that is time consistent. The timing of events in period t is as follows:
(i)given kt, the government sets τt to maximize the household’s utility; (ii)given the prices and tax rates,
the household and firms make their decisions to maximize their own objectives; (iii)all markets clear, and
lt, ct, and prices are determined; (iv)the values of τrt and kt+1 are determined from the budget constraints
of the individual and the government. In other words, the government solves the problem in each period.
Let us call the derived tax rates τ t the time-consistent tax policy.
Proposition 6. The pair of constant tax rates τ = (τw, τ i) is the time-consistent tax policy if they are
given by
τw = 0, τ i =
ζ
1 + ζ
(
1− βc
βc
βl
1− βl
− 1
)
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Accordingly, τ r is given by −βcτ i. Since both the saving tax rate and the wage income tax rate turn
out to be constant over time under the time-consistent tax policy, the saving rate and labor supply are
given by the pair (seqm(τ ), leqm(τ )).
Lemma 6. In the market economy with a time-consistent tax policy τ ,
1. (seqm(τ ), leqm(τ )) = (ssp, lsp);
2. τ i ⋚ 0 if and only if βc ⋛ βl.
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The proof of this lemma is given in the proof of Proposition 6. The first property means that under the
time-consistent tax policy, τ , the allocation by the social planner is replicated in the equilibrium. Then,
the second property shows that the individual’s savings must be subsidized (taxed) when βc > (<) βl.
This result is intuitive given that, in the market economy, each individual’s saving rate is excessively low
(high) if she discounts future consumption at a lower (higher) rate than she does future leisure.
5 Concluding Remarks
We propose a dynamic model in which an individual’s non-unitary time discounting induces preference
reversals. We first characterize the market equilibrium in which the individual’s decision-making satisfies
time consistency. Then, from the normative point of view, we derive the following summarized results.
First, a self in any period strictly prefers the social planning allocation to the laissez-faire allocation,
provided the state variable has the same value. Therefore, our welfare properties differ from those of
previous studies. Second, if we focus on the overall paths of the market equilibrium and social planning,
the following two cases arise. If the individual discounts future leisure more steeply than she does future
consumption, the planning allocation dominates the laissez-faire allocation in the Pareto sense. However,
if she discounts future consumption more steeply than she does future leisure, a conflict can arise among
the different selves of the individual.
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Appendix to
“Welfare Implications of Non-unitary Time Discounting”
A Proof of Proposition 1
We restate the optimization problem of the self in a period:
V (a) = max
c,x,a′
{
u(c) + v(x) + βcVc(a
′) + βxVx(a
′)
∣∣ a′ = Ra+ w − c− px} , (A.1)
where Vc and Vx are recursively defined by the following functional equations:
Vc(a) = u(φc(a)) + βcVc(g(a)), Vx(a) = v(φx(a)) + βxVx(g(a)). (A.2)
The first-order conditions (FOCs) of the problem (A.1) are
v′(x)
u′(c)
= p, (A.3)
u′(c) = βc
dVc(a
′)
da′
+ βx
dVx(a
′)
da′
. (A.4)
Differentiating Vc(a) and Vx(a) in (A.2) with respect to a and adding these together, we obtain
d
da
(Vc(a) + Vx(a)) = u
′(c)
dφc(a)
da
+ v′(x)
dφx(a)
da
+
(
βc
dVc(a
′)
da′
+ βx
dVx(a
′)
da′
)
dg(a)
da
.
Substituting (A.3) and (A.4) into the right-hand side of this equation, we obtain
d
da
(Vc(a) + Vx(a)) = u
′(c)
(
dφc(a)
da
+ p
dφx(a)
da
+
dg(a)
da
)
. (A.5)
Since g(a) is defined as g(a) ≡ Ra− φc(a)− pφx(a),
R =
dφc(a)
da
+ p
dφx(a)
da
+
dg(a)
da
. (A.6)
From (A.5) and (A.6), we obtain the following equation, which appears in the main body:
d
da
(Vc(a) + Vx(a)) = u
′(φc(a))R. (A.7)
Substituting (A.7) into (A.4) and evaluating it in period t yields the following Euler equation:
u′(ct) = βcu
′(ct+1)R+ (βx − βc)
dVx(at+1)
dat+1
.
Using (A.3) and (A.7), the above equation is also expressed as
v′(xt) = βxv
′(xt+1)R+ (βc − βx)p
dVc(at+1)
dat+1
.
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B Proof of Lemma 1
To show this lemma, we guess φc(a,X) and Vl(a,X) as follows:
φc(a,X) = µcR(X)a, Vl(a,X) = bl(X) + dl ln a, (B.1)
where µc, bl(X), and dl are the parameters that we have to solve for. From (7), we have
1− φl(a,X) =
ζµcR(X)a
w(X)
. (B.2)
Using this result and the budget constraint (2) in the main body, we obtain
a′ = g(a,X) = γR(X)a, (B.3)
where
γ = 1− (1 + ζ)µc. (B.4)
Using the above guesses and (B.3), we can rewrite the Euler equation (8) as follows:
1
µcR(X)a
= βc
1
µca′
+ (βl − βc)dl
1
a′
=
(
βc
1
µc
+ (βl − βc)dl
)
1
γR(X)a
,
which results in
γ = βc + µc(βl − βc)dl. (B.5)
At the same time, dl (as well as bl(X)) must satisfy the following functional equation:
Vl(a,X) = ζ ln(1− φl(a,X)) + βlVl(g(a,X), G(X))
Substituting (B.1)–(B.3) into the above equation yields
bl(X) + dl ln a = ζ ln a+ βldl ln a+ other terms, (B.6)
which results in dl = ζ/(1− βl). Substituting this into (B.5),
γ = βc + ζµc
βl − βc
1− βl
. (B.7)
From (B.4) and (B.7), we finally obtain
γ =
βc + λ
1 + λ
,
where
λ ≡
ζ
1 + ζ
βl − βc
1− βl
.
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C Derivation of Equation (9)
When δ = 1, human wealth in the main body is expressed as
∞∑
t′=t
wt′∏t′
ν=t(1 + rν − δ)
=
∞∑
t′=t
wt′∏t′
ν=t rν
=
∞∑
t′=t
(
1∏t′−1
ν=t rν
wt′
rt′
)
. (C.1)
From equation (3),
wt′
rt′
=
1− α
α
Xt′ . (C.2)
To simplify the expression of
∏t′−1
ν=t rν , we first calculate
∑t′−1
ν=t ln rν .
t′−1∑
ν=t
ln rν =
t′−1∑
ν=t
ln
(
AαXα−1ν
)
(∵ equation (3))
= (α− 1)
t′−1∑
ν=t
lnXν + (t
′ − t) ln(Aα). (C.3)
Since we guess that Xt+1 = s
eqmAXαt for all t,
lnXν = ln(s
eqmA) + α lnXν−1 ⇔ lnXν = α
ν−t lnXt +
1− αν−t
1− α
ln(seqmA). (C.4)
Then,
t′−1∑
ν=t
lnXν =
(
t′−1∑
ν=t
αν−t
)
lnXt +
1
1− α
[
(t′ − t)−
t′−1∑
ν=t
αν−t
]
ln(seqmA)
=
1− αt
′−t
1− α
lnXt +
1
1− α
[
(t′ − t)−
1− αt
′−t
1− α
]
ln(seqmA)
=
1
1− α
[
lnXt − lnXt′ + (t
′ − t) ln(seqmA)
]
,
where we use the fact that lnXt′ satisfies equation (C.4) with ν = t
′. Substituting this into the right-hand
side of equation (C.3) yields
t′−1∑
ν=t
ln rν = − lnXt + lnXt′ − (t
′ − t) ln(seqmA) + (t′ − t) ln(Aα)
= lnXt′ − lnXt + (t
′ − t) ln(α/seqm).
Since
∏t′−1
ν=t rν = exp
[∑t′−1
ν=t ln rν
]
, the above equation implies
t′−1∏
ν=t
rν =
Xt′
Xt
( α
seqm
)t′−t
. (C.5)
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Finally, substituting (C.2) and (C.5) into (C.1), we obtain
∞∑
t′=t
1∏t′−1
ν=t rν
wt′
rt′
=
∞∑
t′=t
1− α
α
Xt′
Xt′
Xt
( α
seqm
)t′−t
=
1− α
α
Xt
∞∑
t′=t
(
seqm
α
)t′−t
. (C.6)
If seqm ≥ α, (C.6) implies that the human wealth of the household is infinity in any period, which should
be excluded. Since we guess that seqm < α (and show that this inequality holds), equation (C.6) gives
∞∑
t′=t
1∏t′−1
ν=t rν
wt′
rt′
=
1− α
α− seqm
Xt. (C.7)
Since Xt = kt/l
eqm from the market-clearing conditions for labor and assets, we obtain equation (9).
D Proof of Lemma 2
We state the planner’s problem again here.
V sp(k) = max
k′,l
{
ln(Akαl1−α − k′) + ζ ln(1− l) + βcV
sp
c (k
′) + βlV
sp
l (k
′)
}
. (D.1)
Assume that the planner in a period expects that if the value of capital is given by k, the next self’s
decisions about savings and labor supply are
k′ = gsp(k), l = φspl (k).
Then, functions V spc (k) and V
sp
l (k) are given by the following functional equations:
V spc (k) = ln
[
Akα(φspl (k))
1−α − gsp(k)
]
+ βcV
sp
c (g
sp(k)), (D.2)
V spl (k) = ζ ln(1− φ
sp
l (k)) + βlV
sp
l (g
sp(k)). (D.3)
The FOCs of the problem in (D.1) with respect to k′ and l are given by
1
Akαl1−α − k′
= βc
∂V spc (k′)
∂k′
+ βl
∂V spl (k
′)
∂k′
, (D.4)
(1− α)Akαl−α
Akαl1−α − k′
− ζ
1
1− l
= 0. (D.5)
respectively. We make the following guess for V spi (i ∈ {c, l}):
V spi (k) = ai + di ln k.
From (D.4), we obtain
gsp(k) =
Ψ
1 + Ψ
Akαl1−α, (D.6)
where Ψ is defined as
Ψ ≡ βcdc + βldl. (D.7)
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From (D.5) and (D.6), we obtain
φspl (k) = l
sp, where lsp =
(1− α)(1 + Ψ)
ζ + (1− α)(1 + Ψ)
. (D.8)
Since the value of Ψ is still unknown, we substitute (D.6), (D.8), and the guess for V spj into (D.2) and
(D.3):
ac + dc ln k = ln
(
1
1 + Ψ
Akα(lsp)1−α
)
+ βc
[
ac + dc ln
(
Ψ
1 + Ψ
Akα(lsp)1−α
)]
,
al + dl ln k = ζ ln(1− l
sp) + βl
[
al + dl ln
(
Ψ
1 + Ψ
Akα(lsp)1−α
)]
.
Since the coefficients of both sides must be equal, we can show that
dc =
α
1− βcα
, dl = 0.
Substituting this result into the definition of Ψ, we have
Ψ =
βcα
1− βcα
.
Finally, substituting the obtained value of Ψ into (D.6) and (D.8), we obtain
lsp =
1− α
1− α+ ζ(1− βcα)
,
and
gsp(k) = βcαAk
α(lsp)1−α ⇔ ssp = βcα.
E Proof of Proposition 3
If the saving rate and labor supply are determined so that they are constant over time, we calculate the
utility of a self in period t as follows.
Ut =
∞∑
t′=t
{
βt
′−t
c ln[(1− s)A(kt′)
αl1−α] + βt
′−t
l ζ ln(1− l)
}
=
1
1− βc
[
ln(1− s) + ln
(
Al1−α
)]
+
ζ
1− βl
ln(1− l) +
∞∑
t′=t
βt
′−t
c α ln kt′ . (E.1)
From equation (12) in the main body, we have
ln k′t = α
t′−t ln kt +
1− αt
′−t
1− α
ln(sAl1−α),
where kt is historically given for the self in period t. Substituting this result into the last term in (E.1)
yields
Ut =
1
1− βc
ln(1− s) +
ζ
1− βl
ln(1− l) +
α
1− βcα
ln k +
βcα ln s+ lnA+ (1− α) ln l
(1− βc)(1− βcα)
=W (s, l, k). (E.2)
Note that the following identity holds:
V i(k) ≡W (si, li, k), i ∈ {eqm, sp}.
To obtain this proposition, we first show the following two lemmas.
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Lemma E.1. There exists a unique pair (s∗, l∗) that maximizes W (s, l, k).
Proof. Since this function is strictly concave in (s, l), the necessary and sufficient conditions for (s∗, l∗)
are given by the following FOCs:
∂W
∂s
= 0 :
1
1− βc
1
1− s
=
βcα
(1− βc)(1− βcα)
1
s
,
∂W
∂l
= 0 :
ζ
1− βl
1
1− l
=
1− α
(1− βc)(1− βcα)
1
l
,
which in turn yield
s∗ = βcα,
l∗ =
1− α
1− α+ ζω(1− βcα)
,
where ω ≡ (1− βc)/(1− βl), which deviates from unity if and only if βc ̸= βl.
We next show the following lemma.
Lemma E.2. ssp(≡ s∗) ⋛ seqm and l∗ ⋛ lsp ⋛ leqm if and only if βc ⋛ βl.
Proof. From their definitions, it follows that (seqm, leqm) = (ssp, lsp) = (s∗, l∗) when βc = βl. From the
proof of Lemma 3 in the main body, we know that seqm and leqm are strictly increasing with respect to
βl, whereas s
sp and lsp are independent of βl. Finally, l
∗ is strictly decreasing with respect to βl. Then,
we can show that
ssp ≡ s∗ ⋛ seqm ⇔ βc ⋛ βl,
l∗ ⋛ lsp ⋛ leqm ⇔ βc ⋛ βl.
Having obtained Lemmas E.1 and E.2, we evaluate the ranking between V eqm(k) and V sp(k) by using
the contours of W (s, l, k) in the s-l plane. In panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1, (s∗, l∗) is located at point O,
and the closed curves represent the contours of W (s, l, k). The value of the welfare evaluation function
W (s, l, k) increases as the curves approach O. At any point on the curve passing through point A (B),
V eqm(k) (V sp(k)) is achieved. From Lemma E.2, the distance from points A to O is necessarily farther
than that from points B to O, as long as βc ̸= βl. Furthermore, from this lemma, we can show that points
A and B are located in the same quadrant of the coordinate plane, with its origin given by point O. This
means that when βc ̸= βl, the indifference curve passing through point A is always located outside the
curve passing through point B. Therefore, we show that this proposition holds.
F Proof of Lemma 5
From the definitions of V j(k) and W in (E.2), V j(k) is expressed as
V j(k) =
α
1− βcα
ln k +Aj , j ∈ {eqm, sp},
where Aj is a collection of other terms, independent of k. The above equation shows that V j(k) is strictly
increasing.
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(a) Case of βc > βl (b) Case of βl > βc
Figure 1: Contours of W (s, l, k) and the interrelationship of (s∗, l∗), (seqm, leqm), and (ssp, lsp)
G Proof of Proposition 5
When the saving rate and labor supply are constant over time, the steady state of capital is given by
k = Kss(s, l) ≡ (sA)
1/(1−α)l. (G.1)
Thus, the steady state of k in the market equilibrium is Kss(s
eqm, leqm), while that under social planning
is Kss(s
sp, lsp). We define the function Wss(s, l) as follows:
Wss(s, l) ≡W (s, l,Kss(s, l))
=
1
1− βc
ln
[
(1− s)s
α
1−αA
1
1−α l
]
+
ζ
1− βl
ln(1− l).
We verify that V j(Kss(s
j , lj)) ≡ Wss(s
j , lj). By simple calculations, we find that Wss(s, l) is maximized
at (s∗ss, l
∗
ss), where
s∗ss = α, l
∗
ss =
1− βl
1− βl + ζ(1− βc)
.
To obtain this proposition, we first show the following lemma.
Lemma G.1. Given βc, there exists a unique βl ∈ (βc, 1), such that s
sp < seqm < s∗ss and l
sp < leqm < l∗ss
if and only if βc < βl < βl.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma E.2, we show that
ssp < seqm, lsp < leqm ⇔ βl > βc.
Then, our remaining task is to derive the condition under which seqm < s∗ss and l
eqm < l∗ss hold. From its
definition, seqm converges to α(= s∗ss) as βl → 1. Since s
eqm is strictly increasing with respect to βl, we
first find that
seqm < s∗ss for all βl ∈ (0, 1).
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We next consider the ranking between leqm and l∗ss. From its definition, l
eqm is strictly increasing with
respect to βl and converges to 1/(1 + ζ) as βl → 1. On the contrary, we can easily verify that l
∗
ss is
decreasing with respect to βl, and l
∗
ss = 1/(1 + ζ) when βl = βc, and l
∗
ss → 0 as βl → 1. There exists a
unique βl ∈ (βc, 1) such that
leqm < l∗ss ⇔ βl < βl.
These results show that this lemma holds.
Lemma G.1 shows that if βc < βl < βl, V
eqm(Kss(s
eqm, leqm)) > V sp(Kss(s
sp, lsp)). If βl > βl, it is
ambiguous which case yields higher welfare. Therefore, we focus on the former situation.
Since V eqm(k0) < V
sp(k0), there is at least one period, denoted by T , such that V
eqm(keqmt ) > V
sp(kspt )
if t ≥ T . Then, we can complete the proof of this proposition by showing that such a period T is unique.
To this end, let qt denote qt ≡ ln kt. Then, we can rewrite (12) in the main body as follows:
(12)⇔ ln kjt = α
t ln k0 + (1− α
t) ln
[
(sjA)1/(1−α)lj
]
⇔ qjt = α
tq0 + (1− α
t)qjss, j ∈ {eqm, sp}, (G.2)
where qjss ≡ ln
[
(sjA)1/(1−α)lj
]
= lnKss(s
j , lj) from equation (G.1). Substituting (G.2) into V j(k), we
obtain V j(kjt ) ≡ V
j(t), where V is given by
Vj(t) ≡
α
1− βcα
[αtq0 + (1− α
t)qjss] +A
j .
From Proposition 3, we know that Veqm(0) ≡ V eqm(k0) < V
sp(k0) ≡ V
sp(0) always holds. Moreover,
since we consider the case of βc < βl < βl, V
eqm(T ) > Vsp(T ) as T → ∞. Finally, subtracting Veqm(t)
from Vsp(t) yields
Veqm(t)− Vsp(t) =
α(1− αt)(qeqmss − q
sp
ss)
1− βcα
+Aeqm −Asp.
Since the value of αt decreases as t increases, Veqm(t′) − Vsp(t′) > Veqm(t) − Vsp(t), for all t′ > t, if
qeqmss − q
sp
ss > 0. Note that this condition is automatically satisfied for the case of βl > βc. Thus, there
exists a unique T ∗ > 0, such that Veqm(t) > Vsp(t) if and only if t ≥ T ∗. This proves Proposition 5.
H Analysis of Tax Policies
H.1 Market Equilibrium under the Time-invariant Tax Policy
To obtain the time-consistent tax policy in Proposition 6, we first characterize the market equilibrium
when the tax rates are constant over time: τt = τ for all t, which is necessary to show this proposition.
Let us introduce the following new functions:
rˆ(X) ≡ (1− τr)r(X), wˆ(X) ≡ (1− τw)w(X),
where r(X) and w(X) are given by (3), and the new variable:
kˆt+1 = (1 + τi)kt+1.
The household’s budget constraint is then expressed as
kˆt+1 = rˆ(Xt)kt + wˆ(Xt)lt − ct. (H.1)
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Lemma H.1. In the market equilibrium with the constant tax policy, the saving rate, labor supply, and
capital income tax rate are given by seqm(τ ), leqm(τ ), and τr(τ ), respectively, where
seqm(τ ) ≡
ψ(α+ (1− α)τw)
ψ + (1 + ζ)(1 + τi)
,
leqm(τ ) ≡
(1− τw)(1− α)(1 + ζ + ψ)
(1 + ζ)[ζ(1 + seqm(τ )τi) + (1− τw)(1− α)(1 + ψ)]
,
τr(τ ) ≡ −
τw(1− α) + τis
eqm(τ )
α
,
and
ψ ≡
βc
1− βc
+ ζ
βl
1− βl
.
Proof. As in the case of the laissez-faire environment in Section 3, the self in period t rationally expects
the law of motion for the aggregate state Xt as equation (5) in the main body. Then, the optimization
problem of the self in a period is given by
V (k,X) = max
c,l,kˆ′
{
ln c+ ζ ln(1− l) + βcVc
[
kˆ′/(1 + τi), X
′
]
+ βlVl
[
kˆ′/(1 + τi), X
′
]}
, (H.2)
subject to the budget constraint (H.1). Functions Vc and Vl here are defined as the following functional
equations:
Vc(k,X) = lnφc(k,X) + βcVc [g(k,X)/(1 + τi), G(X)] , (H.3)
Vl(k,X) = ζ lnφl(k,X) + βlVl [g(k,X)/(1 + τi), G(X)] , (H.4)
respectively, where φc(·) and φl(·) are the policy functions for c and l in this case, and g(·) is given by
g(·) ≡ rˆ(·)k + wˆ(·)φl(·)− φc(·).
Hereafter, the arguments of the functions are omitted unless doing so would cause confusion. The
FOCs of the problem (H.2) are
1 + τi
c
= βc
∂Vc
∂k′
+ βl
∂Vl
∂k′
, (H.5)
wˆ
c
=
ζ
1− l
. (H.6)
We derive the equilibrium in this case by use of “guess and verify.” We guess Vi (i ∈ {c, l}) and G are
given by
Vi = ai + bi lnX + di ln(k + ϕX),
G = sAXα.
Then, from (H.1), (H.5), and (H.6), we obtain
l = φl(k,X) ≡ 1−
ζ
1 + ζ +Ψ
rˆ
wˆ
(k + ΛX), (H.7)
c = φc(k,X) ≡
rˆ
1 + ζ +Ψ
(k + ΛX), (H.8)
kˆ′ = g(k,X) ≡
Ψrˆ
1 + ζ +Ψ
(k + ΛX)− (1 + τi)ϕG, (H.9)
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where the definition of Ψ is the same as (D.7):
Ψ ≡ βcdc + βldl,
and Λ is given by
Λ ≡
wˆ + ϕG(X)
rˆX
=
(1− τw)(1− α) + (1 + τi)ϕs
(1− τr)α
.
Substituting (H.7)–(H.9) into (H.3) and (H.4), we obtain
bc = −
1− α
(1− βcα)(1− βc)
, dc =
1
1− βc
, bl = −
1
1− βl
, dl =
ζ
1− βl
,
implying that
Ψ = ψ ≡
βc
1− βc
+ ζ
βl
1− βl
.
Meanwhile, because Λ = ϕ holds, we have
ϕ =
(1− τw)(1− α)
(1− τr)α− (1 + τi)s
. (H.10)
Now, we derive the equilibrium saving rate seqm, labor supply leqm, and capital income tax rate τr.
Since Kt+1 = kt+1 in the equilibrium, the household’s saving behavior must be consistent with the law
of motion of aggregate capital in the market equilibrium. Recalling that Xt+1 = kt+1/lt+1, this implies
G(kt/lt)lt+1 = (1 + τi)
−1g(kt, kt/lt) ∀k, l. (H.11)
Using the household’s condition (H.9), the guess G(k/l) = sA(k/l)α, and the guess that labor supply is
constant in the equilibrium, we can rewrite this consistency condition (H.11) as
sl =
ψα(1− τr)
(1 + τi)(1 + ζ + ψ)
(l + ϕ)− ϕs,
which in turn yields
s =
1− τr
1 + τi
ψα
1 + ζ + ψ
. (H.12)
Since τr is still to be determined, we use the government’s budget constraint (equation (14) in the main
body) and X ′ = sAXα to obtain
τr = −
τw(1− α) + τis
α
. (H.13)
Substituting (H.13) into (H.12), we obtain the equilibrium saving rate:
s = seqm(τ ) ≡
ψ(α+ (1− α)τw)
ψ + (1 + ζ)(1 + τi)
.
Then, substituting this result back into (H.10) and (H.13) yields
ϕ = ϕeqm(τ ) ≡
(1− τw)(1− α)
α+ τw(1− α)− seqm(τ )
,
τr = τr(τ ) ≡ −
τw(1− α) + τis
eqm(τ )
α
.
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Finally, we obtain the equilibrium labor supply leqm using the consistency condition leqm = φl(k, k/l
eqm).
From (H.7), this condition is rewritten as
l =
(1− τw)(1− α)(1 + ζ + ψ)− ζ(1− τr)αϕ
(1− τw)(1− α)(1 + ζ + ψ) + ζ(1− τr)α
.
Then, substituting ϕeqm(τ ) and τr(τ ) into this equation and rearranging the terms, we obtain
l = leqm(τ ) =
(1− τw)(1− α)(1 + ζ + ψ)
(1 + ζ)[ζ(1 + seqm(τ )τi) + (1− τw)(1− α)(1 + ψ)]
.
H.2 Definition of the Time-consistent Policy
In this section, we formally define the time-consistent tax policy. Suppose that the government in period
t sets τt = τ˜ ≡ (τ˜w, τ˜i). while the government in the other periods set the tax rates as τ = (τw, τ i). If
τ˜ ̸= τ , there is unilateral deviation of the government in period t. Let G˜(X, τ˜ ) denote the law of motion
of X, which differs from G(X) obtained in the previous section because of the current government’s
one-period deviation. By definition, G˜(X, τ ) ≡ G(X) (i.e., if τ˜ = τ , they are the same function).
Then, the optimization problem of the household in period t (H.2) is replaced by
V˜ (k,X, τ˜ ) = max
c,l,kˆ′
{
ln c+ ζ ln(1− l) + βcVc
[
(1 + τ˜i)
−1kˆ′, G˜(X, τ˜ )
]
+ βlVl
[
(1 + τ˜i)
−1kˆ′, G˜(X, τ˜ )
]}
.
(H.14)
In equation (H.14), functions Vc and Vl are the same as (H.3) and (H.4), respectively, meaning that the
household’s decision-making is qualitatively the same as that in the previous section. This is simply
because each individual makes her decision taking the factor prices and taxes as given.
Next, we consider the government’s decision-making in period t. In contrast to the household’s
behavior, the government recognizes that it can affect the equilibrium labor supply. In what follows, we
let l˜eqm(τ˜ ) denote the equilibrium labor supply in period t. Owing to the current government’s deviation,
l˜eqm(τ˜ ) can be a different function from leqm(τ ).
We can now define the time-consistent tax policy.
Definition 1. The sequence {τt}
∞
t=0, with τt = τ ∀t = 0, 1, 2 . . ., is the time-consistent tax policy if
∀kt > 0, ∀t = 0, 1, 2 . . . , τ = argmax
τ˜
V˜
[
kt,
kt
l˜eqm(τ˜ )
, τ˜
]
.
In other words, the sequence of tax rates {τt}
∞
t=0, with τt = τ ∀t = 0, 1, 2 . . . is the time-consistent
tax policy if any selves of the government cannot obtain a strictly positive welfare gain by these selves’
unilateral one-shot deviation from τ .
H.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We now show Proposition 6. Suppose that the government in period t deviates from τ and sets τt = τ˜ .
We guess that the law of motion of the aggregate state in this period is given by
G(Xt) = s˜tAX
α
t ,
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where s˜t is the equilibrium saving rate in period t, which can differ from s
eqm(τ ) by the government’s
deviation in this period. Since the pair of tax rates after this period is always given by τ , the equilibrium
labor supply lt+j (j = 1, 2, . . .) is l
eqm(τ ). Therefore, equation (H.11) now implies
G(k/l)leqm(τ ) = (1 + τi)
−1g(k, k/l) ∀k, l
⇔ s˜tl
eqm(τ ) =
ψα(1− τr)
(1 + τi)(1 + ζ + ψ)
(l + ϕ˜t)− ϕ˜ts˜t, (H.15)
where ϕ˜t is the value of ϕ in period t. In addition, by imposing τ = τ˜ and lt+1 = l
eqm(τ ) on the
government budget constraint (14), we obtain
τ˜rr(Xt)kt + τ˜ww(Xt)lt + τ˜iG(Xt)lt+1 = 0
⇔ τ˜rα+ τ˜w(1− α) + τ˜is˜t l
eqm(τ ) = 0. (H.16)
From (H.10), (H.15), (H.16), and the consistency condition, φl(k, k/l) = l, the values of s˜t, lt, ϕ˜t, and τ˜r
are determined as the functions of both τ˜ and τ . Let their values be denoted by s˜eqm(τ˜ , τ ), l˜eqm(τ˜ , τ ),
ϕ˜eqm(τ˜ , τ ), and τ˜r(τ˜ , τ ), respectively. Then,
kt+1 = s˜
eqm(τ˜ , τ )Akαt (l˜
eqm(τ˜ , τ ))1−α,
ct = (1− s˜
eqm(τ˜ , τ ))Akαt (l˜
eqm(τ˜ , τ ))1−α.
Now, we derive the welfare in period t, V˜ [kt, kt/l˜
eqm(·), τ˜ ]. Since the value of ϕ is given by ϕeqm(τ ) in
the subsequent periods, the following equation holds:
kt+1 + ϕXt+1 =
(
1 +
ϕeqm(τ )
leqm(τ )
)
kt+1.
Substituting these results into equation (H.14) yields
V˜
[
kt,
kt
l˜eqm(τ˜ , τ )
, τ˜
]
= ln ct + ζ ln
(
1− l˜eqm
)
+ βc (bc + dc) ln
[
s˜eqm(τ˜ )Akαt (l˜
eqm(τ˜ ))1−α
]
+ other terms,
where “other terms” represent the collection of all terms independent of τ˜ . Note that in the proof of
Lemma H.1, the values of bc and dc are already given and bl + dl = 0 is already verified.
From the above equation, we find that τ˜ affects V˜ only through s˜eqm and l˜eqm. This implies that
obtaining V˜ by choosing τ˜ can also be achieved directly by choosing s˜eqm and l˜eqm. The FOCs for s and
l are given by
βc(bc + dc)
s
=
1
1− s
,
(1− α)[1 + βc(bc + dc)]
l
=
ζ
1− l
.
respectively. Letting (s, l) denote the solutions, we explicitly obtain
s = βcα, l =
1− α
1− α+ ζ(1− βcα)
. (H.17)
26
The tax policy τ is then determined from
s = s˜eqm(τ , τ ), l = l˜eqm(τ , τ ).
Since s˜eqm(τ , τ ) = seqm(τ ), and l˜eqm(τ , τ ) = leqm(τ ), for all τ , substituting seqm(τ ) and leqm(τ ) in
Lemma H.1 into (H.17) yields the following two equations:
s = seqm(τ )⇔ βcα =
ψ(α+ (1− α)τw)
ψ + (1 + ζ)(1 + τi)
,
l = leqm(τ )⇔
1− α
1− α+ ζ(1− βcα)
=
(1− τw)(1− α)(1 + ζ + ψ)
(1 + ζ)[ζ(1 + βcατi) + (1− τw)(1− α)(1 + ψ)
.
The former and latter equations yield
1 + τi =
ψ
(1 + ζ)βc
[1− βc + τw(1− α)/α] ,
and
1 + τi =
(1− βc)ψ
(1 + ζ)βc
−
τw
βc
[
1− βcα
α
+
(1− βc)ψ
1 + ζ
]
,
respectively. Then, from the above two equations, we have τw = 0 and τ i =
1− βc
(1 + ζ)βc
ψ − 1. From the
definition of ψ, we then have
τ i =
ζ
1 + ζ
(
1− βc
βc
βl
1− βl
− 1
)
.
Finally, substituting τw = 0 and s
eqm(τ ) = βcα into (H.13), we obtain τ r = −βcτ i.
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